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INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Alastair M. 
Taylor. Published under the auspices of The Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1960. Pp. xx.ix, 
503. $7.50. 
The author disclaims a "definitive" character for this account of "Indo-
nesian Independence and the United Nations," calling it a case study of 
the activities and effectiveness of the United Nations in the field of pacific 
settlement under Chapter VI of the Charter. However, his meticulously 
thorough, detailed and comprehensive treatment is likely to remain the 
standard treatment of the subject for a long time to come. He writes from 
the vantage point of having served, as a member of the United Nations 
Secretariat, with the Security Council's field machinery in Indonesia until 
shortly before the adjournment, sine die, of the United Nations Commis-
sion for Indonesia in April 1951. He writes, therefore, with authority from 
first-hand knowledge, making effective use of interviews with participants 
as well as the voluminous United Nations documentation. The more inter-
esting and useful part of the book, especially from the point of view of 
the lawyer or political scientist, is to be found in the analysis in Parts Four 
and Five of the roles of the protaganists, the United Nations, and the 
permanent members of the Council, plus Australia, Belgium and India. 
It requires concentration to maintain one's bearings in the multiplicity of 
details which make up the historical account in Parts One to Three. 
In his Foreword, Lester B. Pearson, former Foreign Minister of Canada, 
speaking of World War II as a forcing ground of change in the existing 
political order, remarks that in no place were the hopes for the future and 
the frustrations and bloodshed in the means of realizing them more trag-
ically associated than in Indonesia. This was the more tragic, he points out, 
because the freedom of the Indonesian people was an objective admitted 
by all, including the Dutch, as something both necessary and desirable. 
But it took four years of struggle for the Parties, and of testing for the new 
United Nations, before this came to pass. Pearson observes that its inter-
vention there established a pattern of policy, if not of machinery for the 
future, and adds: "In particular, decisions taken by the Security Council 
began the process of whittling away the Charter reservation of 'domestic 
jurisdiction' until now it is not much more. than something to be observed 
at the United Nations only if you have the votes, or the influence, to make 
good your claim that it must be." 
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The Republic of Indonesia was born, Taylor tells us, on August 17, 
1945 - two days after Japan's capitulation to the Allied Powers. It was 
inaugurated in Djakarta with the reading at the residence of the nationalist 
leader, Sukarno, of what is undoubtedly the shortest proclamation of inde-
pendence on record: "We the Indonesian people proclaim the independence 
of Indonesia. All matters pertaining to the transfer of power, etc., will be 
carried out efficiently and in the shortest possible time. On behalf of the 
Indonesian people - Sukarno, Hatta." It is not surprising that there should 
be conflict and trial in the transfer to a nation so informally launched of 
the sovereignty over the rich Indonesian archipelago that had been vested 
in the proud Dutch State for over three hundred years. 
The Indonesian case is notable in a number of ways for the United 
Nations - it was one of the first political cases to be brought to the Security 
Council; it was the first case in which the United Nations played an in-
strumental part in the erection of an independent state out of a former 
colony; it was the first case in which the United Nations carried a major 
political problem through to a definitive and successful conclusion. 
It appeared first on the Security Council Agenda in January 1946 at 
the Council's First Session, on a charge by the Ukrainian S.S.R. that 
British troops and Japanese enemy armed forces were participating in 
military operations against the local Indonesian population. "I give you 
the lie that we have attacked the Indonesians," was Foreign Minister 
Bevin's reply to the charges. A proposal by the Ukraine calling for a Com-
mission to investigate was rejected, with supporting votes only from the 
Soviets and Poland. The Netherlands representative, invoking Article 2 (7) 
on domestic jurisdiction, declared there was no threat to international 
peace as "a sincere and whole-hearted attempt" was being made to put 
Indonesia "in order on a very liberal basis." 
The Linggadjati Agreement initialled on November 15, 1946 and signed 
by the Dutch Government and the Government of the Republic of Indo-
nesia on March 25, 1947, provided that the parties should "cooperate in the 
rapid formation of a sovereign democratic state on a federal basis to be 
called the United States of Indonesia." Increasingly violent disagreements 
over this agreement culminated in the inauguration by the Dutch on July 
20, 1947 of "police action" against the Republic's forces, and on July 31 
Australia and India brought the case to the Security Council. Australia, 
invoking Article 39 of the Charter, alleged the hostilities constituted a 
breach of the peace, and called upon the Parties, pursuant to Article 40, to 
cease hostilities forthwith. The Netherlands Representative maintained the 
question was one essentially within the jurisdiction of his government, that 
under Article 2 (7) the Council was without jurisdiction, and that Chapter 
VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and 
Acts of Aggression) was not applicable since there was no danger to inter-
national peace and security, "let alone breaches of the peace or acts of ag-
gression in the sense of the Charter.'' The "application of enforcement 
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measures under Chapter VII" is a specific exception to the domestic juris-
diction limitation. 
In order to enable the Council to take timely action to halt the conflict 
the United States proposed to delete references to any article of the Charter. 
This was done and in the fourteen Resolutions adopted by the Council in 
the ensuing three years no Charter provision was invoked as a basis for its 
action. 
While the Council could no doubt have found basis for some of its 
actions in Chapter VII, and did without invoking them, it preferred to 
finesse the question of the basis for its jurisdiction. It acted as a political 
organ, and essentially on political grounds. Confronted with a situation 
which would not wait, the Council chose in effect to treat it as a matter 
likely to endanger international peace and security. Taylor says that, "At 
all times the majority of the members favored a solution of the dispute on 
a political, rather than a juridical basis." He adds at a later point, "A 
strictly juridical approach by the United Nations, namely, to have accepted 
the Netherlands argument and to have washed its hands of the problem, 
could not have solved the issue because of the international friction which 
had already been generated and which threatened to become worse." As 
indicated by Pearson's statement quoted above, the Security Council has not 
shown too tender a regard for the Domestic Jurisdiction limitations imposed 
by Article 2 (7). It has demonstrated a continuing penchant for action to 
implement what it considers the overriding purpose of the Charter -the 
maintenance of peace. It has exhibited a strong disinclination to be con-
fined by restrictive juridical interpretations. 
The problem and position of the Council was further complicated by 
the fact that it was dealing not with two contestants equal in law, but with 
the emergence of a colonial entity into the condition of statehood. While 
the Republic of Indonesia at first contended that the sovereignty of the 
Netherlands had been terminated with the Japanese conquest, it later re-
ceded in practice from this position. In its Resolution of January 28, 1949, 
the Council spoke explicitly of "the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia 
by the Government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia." 
Nevertheless, in the Council's proceedings and in the measures carried out 
by it the Republic was dealt with as at least a de facto sovereign, its action 
implying, according to Kelsen, "an indirect recognition of the Indonesian 
Republic as a 'State.' " 
The measures employed by the Council during the more than three 
years it was seized of the case were of a character to fall both under Chap-
ters VI and VII of the Charter - cease fire orders, establishment of military 
supervision machinery, calls for troop withdrawals under Chapter VII, and 
good offices under Chapter VI. In the early stages it relied on a Good 
Offices Committee, converted into a United Nations Commission by the 
Resolution of January 28, 1949. Taylor portrays two United States repre-
sentatives as playing key, influential roles, Dr. Frank Graham in the earlier 
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stages, and Ambassador Merle Cochran later, particularly in the successful 
conclusion of the Round Table Conference at the Hague from August 23 
to November 2, 1949. The overall United States role comes out of Taylor's 
pages with a rather Machiavellian cast, but as a decisive factor in the final 
successful outcome. 
On September 28, 1950, Indonesia became the sixtieth Member of the 
United Nations. The Indonesian Representative in the Security Council 
declared: "We realize that without the intervention of the Security Council 
the Indonesian Question would have been solved on the battlefield by 
force." Taylor's final appraisal is that the settlement was achieved ex acquo 
et bono and that the United Nations was able thus to perform what the 
Powers that brought it into existence could not have achieved either singly 
or in disparate groups. 
Durward V. Sandifer, 
Professor of International Relations, 
American University, Washington, D.C. 
